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JOHN N. WILLIAMS 
BELIEF-IN AND BELIEF IN GOD 
Of all the examples of'belief-in', belief in God is both the most mysterious 
and the most challenging. Indeed whether and how an apologist can make 
a case for the intellectual respectability of theistic belief, depends upon the 
nature of this 'belief-in'. I shall attempt to elucidate this matter by an 




to 'belief-that' and by treating belief in 
God as a special case of'belief-in'. 
I. BELIEF-IN AND BELIEF-THAT 
Not only can one believe in a variety of things, one can believe in a variety 
of kinds of things. One may believe in a person, e.g. God, one's doctor or 
oneself, in a conscious being, e.g. fairies or one's dog, in a physical object, e.g. 
one's car or crystal ball, or in a kind of object, e.g. sharp tools. Again, one 
may believe in a theory, ideal or practice, e.g. relativity, fidelity in marriage 
or looking after one's teeth, or in an institution, possibility or attribute 
possessed by someone, e.g. British Rail, the possibility of escape or the 
infallibility of the Pope. 
The initial plausibility of the mistaken view that beliefs-in are always 
explicable solely in terms of beliefs-that is due to the fact that some beliefs 
in are simply beliefs-that,1 this latter commonly an existential belief. Belief 
in fairies is simply belief that fairies exist, just as belief in the combustibility 
of nylon is simply belief that nylon is combustible. If A believes in X and his 
belief is not simply a belief-that of these two kinds (i.e. a belief that there is 
an X, or where 'X' is 'the 0 of Y', that 0 is Y) then A either believes that 
X is a good thing or believes that there ought to be an X, or both. 
In believing in Doctor Smith or in British Rail, A believes that Smith is 
a good doctor, and that British Rail is a good thing, just as in believing in 
fidelity in marriage A both believes that fidelity in marriage is a good thing 
and believes that there ought to be fidelity in marriage. Belief in oneself fits 
into this analysis a little awkwardly, for to say that a man believes he is good 
insofar as he believes in himself, sounds odd. Yet insofar as he believes in 
himself he surely believes he is a good X or believes that he is good at 0ing, 
e.g. believes that he is a good philosopher or believes that he is good at 
philosophizing. 
Insofar as A believes in X (where this belief is not straightforwardly 
1 Pace C. K. Grant 'Belief In and Belief That', 12th International Congress 1988, p. 194. 
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identical with a belief-that), i.e. insofar as he believes that X is a good thing 
or believes that there ought to be an X (or both), then A may hold an 
'indeterminate' list of further beliefs-that. This list may vary from believer 
to believer, even though both have the same beliefs-in. Although A and B 
both believe in Doctor Smith, i.e. believe that Smith is a good doctor, A may 
believe Smith is a painstaking surgeon and that he is a skilled diagnostician, 
whereas B merely believes that he is good in treatment and competent in 
prescribing drugs. This gives good reason to suppose that these beliefs-that 
are not components of the belief-in, but rather reasons for it, i.e. since they 
are good reasons for believing that Smith is a good doctor, A will have a 
rational belief in his doctor only if he believes reasons of this sort. The analysis 
given above is correct, but rough. If a man believes in God then he believes 
that God does and should exist, and that He is good, and conversely, but this 
fails to bring out the full meaning of 'A believes in God'. 
Certainly, some, even most, beliefs-in which are not straightforwardly 
identical with a belief-that, nonetheless necessitate a belief that the thing 
believed in exists. A man could not believe in his doctor without believing 
or knowing that he has one. Hence a rational belief in one's doctor entails 
rational belief or knowledge that he exists. 
A partial recognition of this has led to the mistaken and not uncommon 
view2 that beliefs-in that are not just identical with a belief-that (e.g. belief 
in Father Christmas or in the combustibility of nylon) always necessitate 
either knowledge or belief that what is believed in exists. This is not so for 
beliefs in practices or ideals. A man who believes in the practice of taking 
cold showers or in equality of pay need not believe that there is a practice 
of taking cold showers (i.e. that taking cold showers is practised) or that 
there is equality of pay. 
II. BELIEF-IN, EVALUATION AND PERFORMATIVES 
The two sorts of belief-in I have characterized, i.e. belief-in which is straight? 
forwardly identical with a belief-that, and belief-in which is not, are often 
taken to be indicative of two senses of 'belief-in', a factual sense and an 
'evaluative' sense.3 The source of this view is the recognition that 'A believes 
in X 
' 






the 0 of 
Y', that Y is 0) that A values X. It does not follow, however, that there are 
two meanings of'A believes in X', one evaluative and one factual. To say 
(correctly) that the belief-statement means a number of things is not to say 
(incorrectly) that it has a number of meanings. To mean a disjunction is not 
to have a disjunction of meanings. To take the latter course is to ignore 
Ockham's Razor. 
2 
E.g. J.J. Macintosh, 'Belief-in', Mind, N.S. vol. lxxix. (1970), 400. 3 
Originally H. H. Price, Belief (London, 1969), p. 437. Also W. D. Hudson, A Philosophical Approach 
to Religion (London, 1974), p. 90, J.J. Macintosh, ibid. p. 400. 
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While it is correct to say that where a belief-in X is not simply a belief 
that, then the believer values X, it is unhelpful. Explaining belief-in in terms 
of evaluation only leaves more to be explained, not less, unlike the above 
admittedly rough and ready analysis in terms of belief-that. Where 'A values 
X 
' 
does not simply mean that A believes that X is of value, as for beliefs in 
sharp tools or the practice of taking cold showers, then it will be too much 
of an umbrella term taking in an indeterminate variety of problematic 
notions such as faith, trust and commendation. To say that a man believes 
he has a Doctor Smith whom he values is not to explicate successfully his 
belief in Doctor Smith, still less would such an analysis work for belief in 
God. 




has an evaluative sense is sometimes accompanied 
by the view that first person present belief-in sentences are performatives.4 
This can be seen to be clearly false. A sentence 'I 0' is performative if and 
only if by saying 'I 0', a speaker thereby 0's.5 While this is so for 'I promise 
to pay you $5 ', 
' 






I take this woman 
as my wife' it is never so for 'I believe in...'. 
Clearly I can say 'I believe in British Rail' without believing in it, and 
even if what I say is sincere and not mistaken, it is not in saying it that I 
believe in British Rail. Neither is it true that once the speaker has uttered 
' 
I 
believe in X' he has commended X.6 The speaker may be insincere in what 
he says, but whereas a lying promise is still a promise, an insincere com? 
mendation is no commendation. 
III. BELIEF IN GOD 
Consider the following exhaustive alternatives: 
(i) Belief in God simply is a belief that God exists - like a belief in Father 
Christmas. 
(ii) Belief in God entails a belief that God exists 
- like a belief in one's 
doctor. 
(iii) Belief in God does not entail a belief that God exists 
- like a belief in 
equality of pay. 
(i) is surely false. The devils in the New Testament who '...believest that 
there is one God...and tremble'7 surely do not believe in God, for if they did, 
they would be well on the way to salvation.8 Likewise the devout Christian, 
mindful to avoid the shares of the Devil, may believe that the Devil exists, 
but surely does not believe in the Devil. Only Satanists believe in the Devil. 
If A believed that God exists without (at least) believing that God should 
4 W. D. Hudson, ibid. p. 90, J. J. Macintosh, ibid. p. 399. 5 With the exception of its utterance in certain well-known circumstances, e.g. a play. But these are 
not the circumstances that preclude 'I believe in...' from being performative. 6 Pace J. J. Macintosh, ibid. p. 399. 
7 
Epistle of James, Chapter 2, Verse 19. 8 Cf. Augustine, Sermon 144, 2, 2. 
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exist and is good, then this would hardly be a Christian belief. This is the 
force of Malcolm's remark:9 'a "belief that God exists" if it was logically 
independent of any and all ways of regarding him, would be of no interest, 
not even to God.' 
To hold the Christian belief in God surely involves regarding Him and His 
existence as a good thing. A belief that did not involve this would have no 
Christian interest. 
Here Malcolm argues that 
(a) The belief that God exists is not a sufficient condition of belief in God. 
However Malcolm comments in an earlier passage:10 
the inclination we are discussing is to hold that you could believe that God exists 
without believing in God...we are supposed to think that one could believe that God 
exists but at the same time have no affective attitude towards God. 
The rhetoric of the passage shows that Malcolm thinks either that it is 
psychologically or logically impossible to believe that God exists without 
believing in God. But if the impossibility is logical then Malcolm's account 
is self-contradictory, since he now holds that 
(b) The belief in God is a necessary condition of belief that God exists, 
and (a) and (b) are contradictories. 
Malcolm could escape self-contradiction by insisting that he is making a 
case for the psychological impossibility of believing that God exists without 
believing in God. But he expressly denies this:11 
If one conceived of God as the almighty creator of the World and judge of mankind, 
how could one believe that he exists, but not be touched at all by awe or dismay or 
fear? I am discussing logic, not psychology. 
Given the contradiction in Malcolm's view we may say that despite his 
disclaimer, he is discussing psychology, not logic. It is perhaps unlikely that 
anyone should believe that the God of theism exists and not hold affective 
attitudes, but it is not logically impossible. 
It is not even psychologically impossible. A hitherto fervent worshipper of 
God might, like l'?tranger, undergo such psychological debilitation that he 
is left without feelings for anything, yet still hold his cognition intact, so that 
he is without feelings for the God he still believes to exist. Such a person 
could no longer believe in his work, family or God, for a total lack of affective 
attitudes would preclude him from saying sincerely 'I believe that X is a 
good thing and should exist'. But he could surely believe of those things in 
which he used to believe, that they exist. Hence (b) should be rejected and 
(a) accepted. 
Neither is the belief that God exists, with just any affective attitude to 
Him, sufficient for a belief in God. Since the practices of Satanism are 
9 N. Malcolm 'Is it a Religious Belief that "God Exists"?', in Faith and the Philosophers, ed. J. Hick 
(London, 1964), p. 108. 
10 Ibid. p. 107. 
n Ibid. p. 107. 
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parasitic upon those of Theism (e.g the Black and Christian Masses), insofar 
as a man is a Satanist then he believes that God exists. Presumably he holds 
attitudes such as fear, awe and dismay. But a Satanist surely does not believe 
in God. One could believe that both the Devil and God exist, but one could 
not believe in both. Moreover, a child who said that there was a God whom 
he 
'quite liked' would not have expressed a belief in God. 
A plausible view of belief in God is to equate it with belief in each of the 
attributes of God. This is mistaken, however. Belief in the omnipotence of 
God is no more belief in God than belief in the inevitability of progress is 
belief in progress. Just as a man could believe in the inevitability of progress, 
i.e. believe that progress is inevitable, without believing in progress (e.g. 
where he does not believe that progress is a good thing), so a man could 
believe in the omnipotence of God without believing in God. A Satanist could 
believe in the omnipotence of God, believe in the omniscience of God..., i.e. 
believe in each of the necessary characteristics of God that it is possessed by 
God, without believing in God. If a man believes in God, he must believe of 
God that He and His existence, are good. He must have a number of beliefs 
in the necessary attributes of God. This leaves room for cases in which a man 
sincerely thinks that he believes in God, but fails to believe through ignorance 
or doctrinal wrongheadedness. 
Although (b) is false, its converse, (ii), is plausible because (iii), which 
contradicts it, is implausible. As noted above, one cannot argue for (ii) from 
the premise that whatever is believed in is believed to exist, since this is false 
for practices and ideals. The repercussions for the question of the rationality 
of belief in God would be serious were (iii) true. Traditional apologetic proofs 
of God's existence would fail to put belief in Him on even a partly rational 
footing. On the other hand, if (iii) were true, then a belief in God would be 
more like a belief in a practice or an ideal than any belief in any other sort 
of thing. But it is surely implausible to say that all that religious believers 
believe in when they believe in God, are practices or ideals. They do believe 
in such practices as the Mass and such ideals as forgiveness to others, but this 
is not all that their belief amounts to. To describe it as such is to describe a 
corruption or vulgarization of belief in God. A humanist, however sincere his 
enjoyment of church ceremony, does not yet believe in God. (ii) would place 
us too near a Braithwaitian view12 of religious belief as beliefs in unattainable 
ideals that structure the believer's life. 
One might argue that in believing in God one has affective attitudes to 
Him, and these in turn presuppose a belief that the object of these attitudes 
exists. To take this view is to make the analysis of belief in God more 
complicated than the general analysis of belief-in, given above. However, to 
say that if A believes in God then he has affective attitudes to Him is either 
false or overly vague. 
12 R. B. Braithwaite, An Empiricist's View of the Nature of Religious Belief (Cambridge, 1955). 
15 RES 28 
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It would be self-contradictory to say 
' 
I believe in God but I have no faith 
in Him', since one specifies one's religious faith in specifying one's belief in 
God. Belief in God is always at least belief that God is a good thing, whereas 
a lack of faith in God is always a lack of belief that God exists as a good thing. 
On the other hand, it is not contradictory, although it may be self 
vitiating, to say 'I believe in God but I don't rely upon, love or trust Him'. 
One need not trust, love or rely upon that which one believed to be a good 
thing, even if this is God. Admittedly, it would sound odd to say 'I believe 
in God but I don't love Him', but the oddness does not accrue from what 
the believer says but from what religious believers normally mean when 
expressing their beliefs. Part of what one normally means by saying 
' 
I believe 
in God' is that one trusts, loves and relies upon God. 
Likewise what I normally mean by saying to A, 'I know that you have 
problems' is that I sympathize with Him. But this is not part of the meaning 
of what I say, for it is possible for me to know that A has problems but remain 
unsympathetic. 
But unlike a lack of faith in what one believes in, it is quite possible to lack 
love or trust in God, whom one believes in. Suppose that l'?tranger's affective 
debilitation is less than total, so that he is capable of value-judgements but 
incapable of love or trust. Yet as a matter of almost pure cognition, he 
believes that there is a God who is good and who ought to exist. Surely he 
believes in God, although he neither loves nor trusts Him. 
Since one must have faith in God if one believes in Him, it follows that if 
one believes in Him then one believes Him to exist. For surely one cannot 
have faith in what one does not believe to exist. If one puts one's faith in 
something one must surely believe that there is something there to put faith 
in. 
Hence we must accept (iii), i.e. a belief in God entails a belief that God 
exists. And a belief-in that entails beliefs-that will be rational only if these 
beliefs-that are rational too. A can rationally believe in fairies or the infal? 
libility of the Pope only if his beliefs that fairies exist or that the Pope is 
infallible are held on a rational basis. Where his belief-in is not straight? 
forwardly identical to a belief-that such as this, A can rationally believe in 
X only if he rationally believes either that X is a good thing, or that there 
should be an X, or both. 
Where A believes in God, his belief is rational only if he rationally believes 
that God exists, that He should exist and that He is good. Since he must 
rationally believe this of God, he must also rationally believe that God is 
omnipotent, omniscient...and so on for the necessary attributes of God. In 
other words, theistic belief can be intellectually respectable only if a number 
of beliefs-that are rationally held, notably the belief that God exists. 
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